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ABSTRACT 
 
We demonstrate that simply by using the ethnic makeup surrounding a firm’s location, 
we can predict, on average, which trade links are valuable for firms.  Using customs and 
port authority data on the international shipments of all U.S. publicly-traded firms, we 
show that firms are significantly more likely to trade with countries that have a strong 
resident population near their firm headquarters.  We use the formation of World War II 
Japanese Internment Camps to isolate exogenous shocks to local ethnic populations, and 
identify a causal link between local networks and firm trade links.  Firms that exploit 
their local networks (strategic traders) see significant increases in future sales growth and 
profitability, and outperform other importers and exporters by 5%-7% per year in risk-
adjusted stock returns.  In sum, our results document a surprisingly large impact of 
immigrants’ economic role as conduits of information for firms in their new countries.  
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Firms buy and sell goods in a global marketplace.  As this becomes increasingly 
true, understanding how firms differentially navigate this marketplace is critical 
to identifying which firms will ultimately succeed, and how investors should 
allocate capital amongst these firms.  Success in this global setting depends not 
only on the goods or services that firms can provide, but also on the information 
networks that firms can access.  We show that these networks have a first-order 
impact on the trade decisions undertaken by these firms, both in terms of 
imports and exports.  We further explore how quickly the capital markets can 
separate the “strategic” importers and exporters from other firms, and show that 
the market appears to have a difficult time deciphering even openly observable 
channels. 
Increasing exposure to foreign operations has been a consistent time-series 
trend in the United States.  The Bureau of Economic Analysis’s National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA) broad measure of economy-wide firm profits shows 
that the percentage of NIPA national profits coming from overseas has increased 
from roughly 21% in 2000 to 38% in 2010 (Hodge (2011)).  Further, this is not a 
small firm phenomenon, as the entire S&P 500 received 46% of their sales 
revenue from overseas in 2010, growing from only 30% ten years prior. 
Yet although a large and growing number of public firms engage in 
international transactions, we still do not have a full understanding of why firms 
choose to trade with firms in certain countries, and how these decisions affect 
firm value.  To shed light on this question, we exploit variation in ethnic 
population breakdowns across metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the U.S.  
Specifically, we examine how local residents’ ties to their home-countries can play 
a role in creating bilateral trade linkages and whether (and importantly which of) 
these trade links are value-enhancing for firms.  
We do this by focusing on the import and export activity of all US 
publicly-traded firms for the past seventeen years.  We obtain import and export 
data through public records that must be reported by shippers, and then made 
publicly available through customs and port authorities.  We use this data to ask  
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the question of whether there are strategic trade decisions that a firm can make, 
given the immigration patterns that result in concentrated ethnic populations 
close to certain firms.    
An example of our identification strategy is the following.  Suppose we 
consider a firm located in Jersey City, New Jersey, where a common ethnicity is 
Indian.  We first test whether this firm is more likely to trade (either import or 
export) with a firm in India, than a firm located in Bangor, Maine, where Indian 
is not a common ethnicity. We hypothesize that local ethnicities may help lower 
the information barriers for local companies, and thus that firms may enjoy 
benefits from this local advantage. In addition, ethnic make-up may also proxy 
for local demand for a firm’s goods, which can impact optimal importing 
decisions.  We then test the value enhancement of these links. 
We find evidence that firms export more to (and import more from) 
countries with which they have stronger information links.  We measure firm-
country information networks as the share of residents in a firm’s headquarter 
MSA that have the same ethnicity as the country to which the firm is 
exporting/importing (a variable we call “Connected Population”).  A one 
standard deviation increase in connected population increases the amount the 
firm exports to (imports from) a country by 63%, t=4.71 (33%, t=2.66).   
Next we use the formation of World War II Japanese Internment Camps 
to isolate exogenous shocks to local ethnic populations, and identify a causal link 
between local networks and firm trade links.  These internment camps were 
established throughout the country to house Japanese and Japanese-Americans 
originally from the West Coast who were relocated to camps following the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941.  The camps represented a sizable shock to the 
Japanese populations surrounding them, and had an enduring impact on these 
areas as many internees ultimately settled around these camps, having no home 
or work to return to when the war ended.  We find that sixty years later, these 
internment camp locations had significantly higher Japanese populations.   
Further, using the instrumented value of Japanese population (with internment  
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camp locations as an instrument), we show that this exogenously determined 
Japanese ethnic population density had a large and significant impact on local 
firm trading decisions, establishing more cleanly a causal link from surrounding 
ethnic population to firm-level import and export decisions.        
We also show that this increased importing (and exporting) provides a 
tangible benefit to the firm in terms of increased sales and increased profitability 
in their respective industries.  For instance, “strategic exporters” (i.e., firms that 
export to a country that has a large connected population immediately 
surrounding its firm headquarters) significantly increase their future profitability 
(EBITDA/Assets) by over 0.9%, relative to a mean of roughly 2.2%. 
We next go on to explore whether the market understands the value of the 
strategic use of information networks, and the resultant import and export 
decisions of firms.  We find evidence that it does not.  For instance, strategic 
exporters outperform other firms that export to the same countries but that do 
not have local information networks by 50 basis points per month (t=2.15) in 
excess returns, and 57 basis points per month (t=2.78) in 4-factor abnormal 
returns.  Importantly, this outperformance is unaffected by known risk 
determinants, and does not reverse, suggesting that this strategic trading 
behavior is truly important for fundamental firm value, but is only gradually 
realized by the market. 
We also run a number of tests to better establish our proposed 
mechanism.  For example, if it really is these information linkages that are 
increasing the amount of importing (and exporting) to the countries represented 
by the connected population, then we might expect that when these connections 
are more valuable, we should see these connections utilized more heavily.  We 
test this idea by looking at tariff controls between the US and a given connected 
country for a given product.  Consistent with lower (higher) tariffs increasing 
(decreasing) the value of the information network connection, we see significantly 
more strategic trading by firms (i.e., trading to the country of the connected  
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population) where US import tariffs are lower.  This is consistent with the 
variation in the value of the network causing variation in strategic trading.   
Next, we dig deeper into the exact manner in which the information is 
transferred across the network, and thus profitably used by firms.  While we 
cannot obtain the ethnic make-up of the entire employee base or management of 
all firms, we do collect the ethnic makeup of the firm’s entire board of directors 
for all firms in our sample.  From this data, we can identify one channel, through 
the board of directors, that this information network may be utilized.  We first 
show that local ethnic population is a strong predictor of a board’s ethnic make-
up (i.e., if there is a larger Chinese population in a given state, the 
exporting/importing firm’s board is significantly more likely to have Chinese 
board members). We then find that when a strategic importer (exporter) has a 
connected board member on its firm board, it trades significantly more with the 
connected country.  For instance, firms export 68% more than the median firm 
(t=2.87) to countries from which they have a connected board member.  Further, 
as is the case with strategic importers (exporters), the market does not fully 
understand the value of these connected board members: firms that exploit these 
connected board members in their trading decisions have predictable future 
positive abnormal stock returns.   
Lastly, we show that in addition to market participants not fully realizing 
the value of the information network for strategic importing and exporting firms, 
sell-side analysts make the same mistakes.  Specifically, analysts are significantly 
less accurate in their earnings forecasts of strategic importers and exporters.   
Further, when their increased sales and profitability are reported at quarterly 
earnings announcements, strategic importers and exporters have significantly 
more positive earnings surprise returns. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a 
brief background and literature review. Section II describes the data, while 
Section III documents the impact of the connections on firm-level trade. Section  
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IV establishes the returns to strategic importers and exporters that utilize these 
connected information networks. Section V concludes. 
 
I. Background and Literature Review 
Our research adds to a large literature analyzing the strategic entry mode 
choices of firms seeking to expand their businesses to overseas markets. 
According to Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), these choices include exporting, 
joint venture, licensing, and direct investment. The underlying theme in this 
literature is that few companies can afford to do business in all countries at the 
same time; therefore firms should weigh the relative advantages of these entry 
modes in different regions of the world.  The early marketing literature provides 
normative guidelines on the process of internationalizations include Cavusgil and 
Nevin (1981) and Green and Allaway (1985), among others; whereas recent 
research on the topic focuses on the consequences of entry mode on firm 
operations. For example, Pan, Li, and Tse (1999) show that early entrants have 
significantly higher market shares and profitability than late followers. In 
addition, several papers investigate whether cultural proximity of foreign markets 
to local markets affects entry timing and mode, and find conflicting results. For 
example, the findings in Mitra and Golder (2002) suggest that cultural distance 
to domestic market is not a significant factor in entry timing; whereas Loree and 
Guisinger (1995) argue that it is. Our paper demonstrates that local ethnic 
populations around the headquarters of a firm impact the bilateral trade relations 
to connected countries.  We also show that board members who are connected to 
trade partners through their nationalities provide information advantages that 
generate value for firms.  
Our paper also links to a vast literature investigating the drivers and 
implications of international trade. Bernard et al. (2005) argue that, when 
investigating the causes and implications of international trade, the literature 
emphasizes several factors including comparative advantage, increasing returns to 
scale and consumer preference for variety, but focuses less on the firms that  
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actually drive trade flows. They show that firms that export differ substantially 
from firms that solely serve the domestic market in several dimensions: across a 
wide range of countries and industries, exporters have been shown to be larger, 
more productive, more skill- and capital-intensive, and to pay higher wages than 
non-trading firms. Gould (1994) shows that immigrant ties in the United States 
(and Canada) play a role in increasing bilateral trade flows and conclude that 
immigrant ties (or links) provide knowledge of home-country markets, language, 
preferences, and personal contacts that have the potential to decrease trading 
transactions costs.  We add to this literature by introducing the effects of local 
ethnicities as a determinant of firm-level imports and exports. 
Lastly, our research is broadly related to prior studies that analyze 
investors’ delayed and biased reactions to information.  The basic theme of this 
strand of literature is that, if investors have limited resources and capacity to 
collect, interpret, and finally trade on value-relevant information, we would 
expect asset prices to incorporate information only gradually. One of the 
contributions of our paper is to highlight the importance of scrutinizing local 
resources in understanding asset prices. If investors pay less attention to firms 
exploiting local advantages, asset prices may exhibit predictable patterns. There 
is an extensive literature on investors’ limited attention to information. On the 
theoretical side, numerous studies, such as Merton (1987), Hong and Stein 
(1999), and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), argue that, in economies populated by 
investors subject to binding attention and resource constraints, delayed 
information flows can lead to expected returns that are not explained by 
traditional asset pricing models.  Subsequent empirical studies find evidence that 
is largely consistent with these models’ predictions. For example, Huberman and 
Regev (2001), Barber and Odean (2006), DellaVigna and Pollet (2006), Hou 
(2006), Hong, Torous, and Valkanov (2007), and Cohen and Frazzini (2008), 
Huang (2011), and Nguyen (2011) find that investors respond quickly to 
information that catches their attention (e.g., news printed on the New York 
Times, stocks that have had extreme returns or trading volume in the recent 
past, and stocks that more people follow), but tend to ignore information that is  
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less salient yet nonetheless essential to firm values.  In addition, Cohen and Lou 
(2011) find that investors have difficulty in incorporating industry news into 
conglomerates (as opposed to simple stand alone firms in the same industry), 
while Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2011) find that investors do not understand 
and price the predictable innovation ability of firms.  These behaviors on the part 
of investors usually result in significant asset return predictability in financial 
markets.  We document exactly this type of return predictability by showing that 
the stock market is slow to recognize the value of firms’ strategic use of 
information networks, and the resultant import and export decisions of firms. 
 
II. Data 
We obtain data from several sources. Our international trade data comes 
from Journal of Commerce's Port Import Export Reporting Service (Piers), a 
subsidiary of UBM Global Trade. Piers collects “bill of laden” level import and 
export data from three major sources: U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
Automated Manifest System, Piers’ own reporters located in 88 major ports in 
the U.S., and foreign partners whose national Customs authorities provide 
comparable data. A bill of laden is a legal document between the shipper and the 
carrier that outlines the type, quantity and destination of the  good being 
carried.  Our data includes standard information provided on bill of laden and 
value added fields such as content (HS Code level) and the value of the cargo, 
both of which are estimated by Piers. We match Piers data to public firm names 
using shipper (for exports) and receiver (for imports) firm names using name 
matching algorithms. Panels A and B of Table I reports the firm characteristics 
of public firms that import and export, and Panel C of Table I provides industry 
breakdowns of exporters and importers. Appendix Table A1 provides the 
analogous firm characteristics for non-importers and non-exporters. Table II 
reports the top 4 destination and target ports for imports and exports. 
We obtain local ethnicity data as follows.  We use metropolitan statistical 
area (MSA)-level population data drawn from the American Communities  
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Project (ACP), provided by Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences at Brown 
University.
1 The Census Bureau uses a standard set of definitions of the area 
included in each MSA. In most cases an MSA includes both a central city (or 
sometimes two or more central cities) and the ring of surrounding suburbs. ACP 
data contain data for 331 MSAs. To match MSA to zipcodes of firm 
headquarters, we use Census U.S. Gazetteer files for 1990 and 2000.
2   
Unlike Census data, ACP data help identify the national origins of 
Hispanic and Asian ethnicities. ACP data allows us to disaggregate Hispanic 
ethnicity to 19 nations and Asian ethnicities to 7 nations. In cases where we 
cannot map a given nation that exists in export/imports files, we use the 
mapping in ethnicity to identify a nation that is more likely to proxy for 
population of that nation’s presence in the U.S.  For example, we use Filipino 
population figures to proxy for Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia and 
Malaysia.  Appendix Table A2 presents our country-to-MSA population 
mappings. 
In various robustness tests, we also use coarser definitions of ethnicity 
drawn directly from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census, and which are available at 
the state level. The ethnicity information in the Census is based on self-
identification questions in which residents choose their origin(s) or descent(s).   
Appendix Table A3 presents these country-to-Census ethnicity mappings.   
We determine the nationality of corporate board members using 
biographical information provided by BoardEx of Management Diagnostics 
Limited, a private research company specialized in social network data on 
company officials of US and European public and private companies.  
Finally, we also obtain Harmonized System Code (HS Code) level tariff 
information from TRAINS dataset provided by United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  A typical entry in this dataset would be as 
follows: In year 2003, U.S. applied 4% tariff rate for Brazil nuts (HS Code 
080120) to Brazil. Tariff information contains not only most favorite nation 
																																																								
1 http://www.s4.brown.edu/cen2000/data.html. 
2 http://www.census.gov/geo/www/gazetteer/gazette.html.   
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(MFN) tariff rates, but also, rates agreed upon in various preferential regimes 
including regional trade agreements (RTA), preferential trade agreements (PTA) 
and bilateral agreements. If tariff data is missing for a particular importing 
country in a particular year for a given HS code, we use the most recent values 
as major tariff changes take place very infrequently. 
 
III. The Impact of Connections on Firm-Level Trade 
A. Import and Export Decisions of Firms 
We first test the hypothesis that firms export more to (and import more 
from) countries with which they have stronger information links.  We measure 
firm-country information networks as the share of residents surrounding a firm’s 
headquarters that have the same ethnicity as the country to which the firm is 
exporting/importing (a variable we call “Connected Population”), where we use 
the fine measure of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to define surrounding 
area (with an analogous state-level measure included in Appendix Table A4).  As 
joint location can be influenced by many factors, Section A can be seen as 
documenting the base relationship between surrounding ethnicities and firm trade 
decisions, while we establish a cleaner causal relationship in Section C.   
The dependent variable in our tests is a firm’s import/export behavior in a 
given year.  Specifically, for each firm in each year we compute its “Export 
Ratio” as the total amount that a given firm exports to a destination country in 
a given year scaled by the total amount of exports by the firm in that year (Eict 
/Sum(Eit)).
3  We define “Import Ratio” analogously for imports.  All export and 
import figures are converted to U.S. dollars, and represent the dollar value of 
exports and imports by a given firm.         
																																																								
3 If we instead scale by exports of all U.S. public firms to the given country in the same year, we 
also find strong and significant results.  The magnitudes are actually quite close, on average 
roughly 4-7% larger than in Table III, while each analogous specification is highly statistically 
significant (p<0.01).  
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In Table III we present results from a panel regression of firm-level export 
and import behavior on firm-country information networks, plus a host of fixed 
effects.  The unit of observation in these regressions is firm-country-year, and all 
standard errors are clustered at the year level to broadly allow for any 
correlations that impact all firms over a given year (i.e., tariff changes, conflicts, 
shipping blockages, etc.).
4  Panel A presents the results with Export Ratio as the 
dependent variable; each specification shows that Connected Population (CPct) is 
a positive and significant predictor of a firm’s country-level export share.  We 
add fixed effects across specifications in Columns 1-3 for firm, year, MSA, 
country, firm x year, and MSA x country, with the coefficient on Connected 
Population remaining large and significant.  In terms of magnitude, the 
coefficient of 0.039 (t=4.71) on CPct in Column 2 implies that for a one-standard 
deviation increase in CPct, a firm’s Export Ratio increases by 1.30%; relative to 
median Export Ratio 2.06%, this implies a 63% increase, which is large in 
magnitude. 
Panel B presents the identical set of tests using Import Ratio as the 
dependent variable.  As in the export tests, we find that ethnic information links 
are strong positive predictors of firm-level import behavior.  The magnitude of 
this effect is again large: the coefficient of 0.032 (t=2.70) on CPct in Column 2 
implies that for a one-standard deviation increase in CPct, a firm’s Import Ratio 
increases by 1.05%, which this translates into a 34% increase (when compared to 
the median Import Ratio of 3.14%). 
 
A.1 Connected Board Members and Trade Decisions 
We next explore in more depth the exact manner in which the information 
is transferred across the network.  While we cannot obtain the ethnic make-up of 
the entire employee base or management of all firms, we do collect the ethnic 
makeup of the firm’s entire board of directors for all firms in our sample.  From 
																																																								
4 We have run these analyses also clustering standard errors at the firm level, MSA level, and 
state level, which give comparable standard errors, and all results remain significant.    
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this data, we can identify one channel, through the board of directors, that this 
information network may be utilized.  These directors are involved with 
important firm-level decisions, such as the establishment and continuation of 
export and import relationships with foreign firms (Gevurtz (2004)).  We first 
show that local ethnic population is a strong predictor of a board’s ethnic make-
up (i.e., if there is a larger Chinese population in a given MSA, the 
exporting/importing firm’s board is significantly more likely to have Chinese 
board members). Specifically, the correlation between the percentage population 
from a certain country and having that country represented on the board of a 
firm in that MSA is highly significant (=0.20, p<0.01). 
The variable we use to capture the impact of this ethnic link seen through 
the board of directors is Connected Board Member, which is a categorical 
variable equal to 1 if the firm has board member whose nationality is the same as 
that to which the firm is importing (exporting), and 0 otherwise.  From Panel A 
and Panel B of Table III, this connected board measure is a large and significant 
determinant of firms’ trading decisions. For instance, in Column 4 of Panel A, 
the coefficient estimate of 0.014 (t=2.87) implies that a firm exports 68% more to 
countries from which it has a connected board member. 
 
B. Tariff Analysis 
In our next set of tests, we exploit shocks to the value of firm-country 
links.  In particular, we use product-level data on imports for the firms in our 
sample, and identify situations where country-specific tariffs set by the US on 
types of goods are higher or lower.  Thus our tests are similar to those in Table 
III, except that they are now run at the product level, and hence the unit of 
observation in the regressions is the firm-product-country-year.  In addition, we 
include new variables designed to measure the impact of tariffs, for example a 
variable called “Tariff” which is equal to the US import tariff on the given 
product imported from the given country in the given year.  These tariffs are 
gathered from TRAINS dataset maintained by United Nations Conference on  
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Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  We also include the interaction term 
between tariff cuts and firm-country information links (Connected 
Population*Tariff).  Since US tariffs only bind for imports, we only run these 
tests using the Import Ratio as the dependent variable. 
Table IV presents the results of these tests.  Specifically, we run panel 
regressions of import ratios on firm-country information links, plus the tariff 
variables described above, along with various fixed effects including firm-, year-, 
and product-fixed effects.  From Column 3, the coefficient on the interaction 
term (Connected Population*Tariff), which is negative and significant (=-0.0022, 
t=4.49), suggests that Connected Population has only roughly 20% the impact 
when tariffs are one standard deviation larger to the country.  In other words, 
precisely when it is more costly to utilize the advantages of the Connected 
Population, Connected Population has a significantly smaller effect on import 
decisions of firms.   
Taken as a whole, the results in this section are consistent with firms 
exporting (importing) significantly more to (from) countries with which they 
have stronger information links.  Both effects are economically large, and indicate 
that firms exploit their information networks when making their trade decisions.  
Further, at times when particular products are most attractive (such as after a 
tariff cut), the impact of these information linkages on product-level import 
behavior is most pronounced.  
 
C. Japanese Internment Camps of World War II 
Although we have shown a strong correlation between surrounding ethnic 
population and trade activity, nothing up to this point has addressed the direct 
causal impact of ethnic population on import/export activity.  This relationship 
could be driven by a number of factors and not necessarily be a direct causal 
channel through ethnic population to trade.  For instance, it could be that groups 
of firms are simply bringing in the foreign populatio n  w h e n  t h e y  p l a n  t o  
import/export to the resultant country.  It may also be that some outside factor  
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is causing both people of a certain ethnicity, and firms planning to trade with 
their home country, to locate in the same location, but the ethnic population 
themselves have no direct impact on trade.  One example of this is geographic 
distance.  For instance, it is both easiest for Vietnamese immigrants to reach 
California (as opposed to New York), along with it being cheaper for California 
firms to ship goods to and from Vietnam (relative to a New York firm).   
Although we control for this particular channel in Table III, other types of these 
common attributes could drive both ethnic population and trade, but have no 
causal path. 
In order to establish causality, we need to either exogenously “drop” firms 
in random locations, or exogenously drop ethnic populations in random locations, 
and then run our test to see if these exogenously matched firm-surrounding 
ethnicities product the same impact.  We run exactly this latter experiment by 
examining the Japanese Internment Camps of World War II. 
The Japanese Internment Camps were part of a program by the United 
States government to relocate and intern Japanese and Japanese-Americans 
following the attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.  The relocation stemmed from a 
worry
5 that if there were an invasion by Japan, these citizens might work against 
US interests.  The camps were constructed in 1942, and held nearly 115,000 
Japanese and Japanese-Americans.  The internment camps were distributed 
unevenly throughout the US, as shown in the Figure I, with peak populations 
shown in the accompanying table.  An additional important aspect of the 
relocations is that they represented substantial increases in terms of Japanese-
origin population for states of the relocation camps.  To illustrate this, we 
collected data from the 1940 for the states that had internment camps, and show 
this also in Figure 1.  From this, for instance, Arkansas had only 3 people of 
Japanese descent in the 1940 census.  Accordingly, the number of Japanese that 
were interned in these camps represented a substantive shock to the total 
Japanese population in these states.    
																																																								
5 The order to create the camps and authorize the relocations themselves was Executive Order 
9066, signed into law on February 19, 1942.  
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The camps were fully evacuated by 1946 (Burton et. al (2000)).  However, 
prior to internment, many of these internees had to quickly sell their homes and 
other assets before leaving, as they were not sure what would happen to them, 
nor how long they were to be interned, causing the assets to sell at depressed 
prices (Okamoto (2000)).  Added to this were the acts of violence and 
discrimination faced by those that did try to return to their former West Coast 
home cities, resulting in many internees resettling in the regions surrounding 
their internment camps (Ina et al. (1999)). 
Our identification comes from these internees who decide to remain, settle, 
and form communities in the regions around the internment camps.  However, we 
need to formally establish the fact that they do materially impact the population 
of Japanese origin in the decades following, and particularly during our sample 
period.  This first-stage regression is shown in Panel A of Table V.  It is simply 
testing whether the states that housed internment camps see a larger percentage 
of Japanese origin population today.  The dependent variable is thus Connected 
Population from Table III, the percentage of the population of Japanese origin. 
The independent variable Japanese Internment Camp is then a categorical 
variable indicating whether there was an Internment Camp in that state or not.  
In this analysis we are restricting the sample solely to connections to Japan, and 
so are only finely estimating the varying connections to Japan across the 
geographic MSAs given the Japanese Internment relocation camp locations. 
From Panel A of Table V, we see that MSAs in states that had a 
Japanese Internment camp during World War II have a significantly higher 
fraction of Japanese origin connected population today.  All four columns (run 
for the MSAs that export to Japan in the Columns 1 and 2, and MSAs that 
import from Japan in Columns 3 and 4) deliver this same message.  Column 2 (4) 
addresses that some of the MSAs that had Japanese Internment Camps were 
located along the western coast, and so may have more Japanese origin citizens 
because of this geographic proximity to Japan.  So, we include fixed effects for all 
states on the western coast and Hawaii. Even including these fixed effects, the 
impact is large and significant.  From Column 2, the coefficient of 0.0017  
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(t=22.53), implies a 45% larger current Japanese population in areas surrounding 
Japanese Internment Camps of World War II relative to areas without.  For the 
same specification for Japanese importing MSAs from Column 4, the coefficient 
of 0.0019 (t=27.01) suggests a 50% larger current Japanese population in areas 
surrounding Internment Camps relative to areas without.     
This provides strong evidence for the first stage of the instrumental 
variable test.  For the second stage, we then regress trade activity today on this 
instrumented value of connected population to see its impact.  In other words, we 
examine the impact on trade activity of solely the part of the Japanese connected 
population today that was determined by having (vs. not having) a Japanese 
Internment Camp in the surrounding area in World War II.  These second stage 
regressions are shown in Panel B of Table V.  All four columns show that this 
instrumented connected population has a large and significant impact on trade 
activity today.  For instance, the coefficient in Column 2 of 60.612 (t=4.89) 
implies that a one standard deviation increase in connected population increases 
the Export Ratio by 65% (from 22.5% to 37.2% of exports to Japan).  For 
imports, the estimated coefficient in Column 4 of 45.099 (t=2.28) implies that a 
one standard deviation increase in connected population increases the Import 
Ratio by 62% (from 21.9% to 35.5% of imports from Japan).  These are similar in 
magnitude to the estimates from Table III. 
 
C.1 Firms founded before World War II 
As a last remaining concern, one might that think that firms location 
choices may still be impacted by the population ethnicities it observes.  So, 
although the Japanese origin citizens are exogenously assigned, firms who plan to 
trade with Japan may be responding by deciding to establish themselves around 
Japanese population centers.  In a sense, this is in line with our explanation, as 
firms’ trade decisions are still impacted by the population ethnicity, and so given 
that part of that ethnic profile was exogenously determined, it would simply  
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mean that even firm establishment locations are impacted by the same 
population ethnicities.  
However, to even more cleanly measure the impact of the exogenous 
population ethnicity on firm decisions, we examine only firms that were founded 
before the Japanese Internment Camps populations existed.
6  We thus restrict 
solely to firms founded before 1946, the year in which the Japanese Internment 
Camps dissolved and had released all internees.  Although this obviously reduces 
the sample size, the same results from Table V obtain.  Namely, the first stage 
regressions still have large and significant coefficients on the impact of Japanese 
Internment Camps on Japanese population today.  For instance, the analogous 
coefficient from Column 2 of Table V Panel A is 0.0016 (t=14.25) is nearly 
identical to the 0.0017 from full sample.  The second stage is where the sample 
size drop is more severe (as these are at the firm level).  Even taking this into 
account, all of the magnitudes are similar with 3 of 4 of the coefficients even 
statistically significant.  For instance, the analogous coefficient to Table V Panel 
B, Column 4, now solely run on those firms founded before 1946, is 31.553 
(t=1.78), implying a 35% increase in exports to Japan for these firms following a 
one standard deviation increase in instrumented Japanese ethnic population 
(using Internment Camps established after the firms founding dates in those 
locations). 
All of the evidence in this section helps provide a causal link to the results 
from Tables III and IV regarding the impact of surrounding ethnic population on 
firms’ international trade decisions, and the influence they exert on these 
decisions. 
 
IV. Strategic Traders and the Returns to Information Networks 
In this section we build on the results above, and ask to what extent do 
firms benefit from using their firm-country networks in their import and export 
																																																								
6 We obtain firm founding date data from the Field-Ritter Founding Date Dataset available at: 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm, as used in Field and Karpoff (2002) 
and Loughran and Ritter (2004).    
17 
	
decisions.  For example, one could imagine firms overweighting certain countries 
in their import and export decisions due to a form of familiarity bias; 
alternatively one might expect firms to tilt their trading focus as a result of 
superior private information about certain countries.   
We try to disentangle these two possibilities by examining the future 
outcomes of firms that exploit their firm-country linkages in their trading 
decisions.  We term those firms that exhibit strong links between their ethnic 
environment and their major trading partners as “Strategic Traders.”  The 
essence of our approach is to isolate firms that export primarily to countries 
where there is a match between the destination country’s ethnicity and the firm’s 
headquarter location’s ethnic composition. Since each firm can have an 
export/import relationship with several different countries over the same time 
period, a goal of our approach is to identify firms that choose their export 
countries in line with their various potential information linkages.  Because some 
firms will trade with only 1 country across a given time period, and others will 
trade with many, the number of possible “informed” or “linked” shipments each 
month will vary by firm.  As a result, we first create buy/sell signals (to denote 
“linked” versus “non-linked” shipments) based on a firm’s export amount in a 
given month, its destination country, and the match between the destination 
country’s ethnicity and the firm’s headquarter MSA’s (metropolitan statistical 
area) ethnic composition. We employ MSA-level ethnicity shares, and match 
these to destination countries as shown in Appendix Table A2. In every year for 
each MSA, we compute the share of each ethnicity that resides in each MSA.  
We then rank the share of each ethnicity across all MSAs in the US.  The buy 
signal equals one if (i) a firm’s share of total industry exports to a given country 
in a given month is ranked in the top 3,
7 and (ii) the firm is located in an MSA 
																																																								
7  Our results are similar if we measure export intensity within-firm (e.g., using the “Top 3” 
export amounts within a given firm in a given month), or if we use industry export decile 
breakpoints (top decile) rather than a “Top 3” ranking.  Finally, our results are also virtually 
identical if we use firm-level export shares to a given industry rather than absolute amounts.  For 
example, Firm A could export $100 worth of materials to Italy and $100 to Germany, while Firm 
could export $10 worth to Italy and $5 to Germany; in absolute terms Firm A exports more, but  
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where the MSA’s ethnicity share across all MSAs in the US is ranked in the top 
3.  The sell signal equals one if (i) a firm’s share of total industry exports to a 
given country is ranked in the top 3, but (ii) the firm is *not* located in an MSA 
where the MSA’s ethnicity share across all MSAs in the US is ranked in the top 
3.  For the real outcomes tests below, we define a firm as a “Strategic Exporter” 
if the firm has at least one buy signal for any of its exports in a given year; 
meanwhile a firm is defined as a “Non-Strategic Exporter” if it has zero buy 
signals in a given year, and has at least one sell signal.   
A simple example helps to clarify our approach.  Consider two firms: A 
and B.  Firm A is located in an MSA (e.g., Jersey City, New Jersey) where the 
share of Indian residents is in the top 3 across all MSAs. Firm A exports a 
significant amount (relative to its industry) in a given month to India.  By 
contrast, Firm B is located in a different MSA (e.g., Bangor, Maine) where the 
share of Indians is not in the top 3 across all MSAs (Bangor is ranked 156
th in 
population share of Indians across all MSAs), and yet Firm B also exports a 
significant amount (again relative to its industry) in a given month to India.  
Thus although Firm A and Firm B are engaging in identical behavior (exporting 
a significant amount to India in a given month), Firm A will be classified as a 
“Strategic Exporter,” and Firm B will be classified as a “Non-Strategic 
Exporter.”  
Using this classification procedure, we then examine the future real 
outcomes and future stock returns of these strategic traders.   
 
A. Future Real Outcomes of Strategic Traders 
We first investigate whether strategic traders on average achieve superior 
real outcomes in the future, relative to their non-strategic counterparts.  To do 
so, we run panel regressions of future sales and future profitability on lagged 
strategic trading activity.  The dependent variables are: 1) future sales (in year 
t+1) divided by lagged assets (in year t); and 2) ROA (defined as future 
																																																																																																																																																																					
its within-firm share (50%) would be smaller than Firm B’s (66%) within-firm share; our results 
are similar for both of these ranking measures.  
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EBITDA in year t+1 divided by lagged assets in year t). We also include a series 
of control variables, including size (log of market capitalization), B/M (log of the 
book-to-market ratio), leverage (long-term debt in year t divided by lagged assets 
in year t), and cash (future cash in year t+1 divided by lagged assets in year t).  
We also include fixed effects for time (year) and firm in all of these regressions. 
Table VI presents the results of these real outcome tests.  Specifically, 
Column 1 shows that strategic exporters achieve higher sales in the future.  The 
coefficient of 0.026 (t=2.89) implies that relative to a mean sales-to-lagged assets 
figure of 0.57, strategic exporters achieve 1.5% higher future sales.  Meanwhile 
the coefficient indicator variable for non-strategic exporters is close to zero, and 
insignificant.  In terms of future profitability (EBITDA/Assets), Column 3 
indicates that strategic importers achieve significantly higher profitability 
(coefficient=0.009,  t=2.05); relative to average profitability of 0.022, strategic 
exporters experience a 43% increase in profitability.  At the same time, non-
strategic exporters show a statistically significant decline in profitability 
(coefficient=-0.006, t=2.95) in the year after their non-strategic export decisions, 
on the order of 27%.  Columns 5-8 repeat the same tests for imports, and reveal 
that strategic importers earn significantly higher sales (coefficient=0.019, 
t=3.24), but do not achieve significantly higher profitability.  Non-strategic 
importers show no increases in sales or profitability in the future.  Collectively, 
the results in Table VI suggest that strategic traders do receive real, tangible 
benefits from their firm-country networks in their import and export decisions, as 
strategic traders achieve higher sales (for both imports and exports) and higher 
profitability (for exports) relative to non-strategic traders. 
 
B. Future Stock Returns of Strategic Traders 
Next we examine the future stock returns of strategic traders versus non-
strategic traders.  The goal of these tests is to determine if the market properly 
prices the real outcome benefits that strategic traders receive from their import 
and export decisions.  We begin with exports, and construct buy/sell signals for 
all export decisions as in the real outcome tests from Table VI; however, since  
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returns are available monthly (unlike accounting variables), we now define a firm 
as strategic exporter if the firm has at least one buy signal for any of its exports 
in a given month.  A firm is defined as a non-strategic exporter if it has zero buy 
signals in a given month, and has at least one sell signal. Each month we 
construct calendar-time portfolios that buy stocks of strategic exporters and sell 
non-strategic exporters. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly, and stocks are held 
for one month.   
Table VII shows the results.  The first row of each panel presents excess 
returns (raw returns minus the risk-free rate), the second row shows DGTW-
adjusted returns, the third row shows CAPM alphas, the fourth row shows 
Fama-French 3-factor alphas, and the fifth row shows Carhart 4-factor alphas.  
In Panel B, we replicate the calendar time portfolio approach from Panel A for 
our imports sample.   
Panel A of Table V indicates that a portfolio strategy that buys strategic 
exporters and shorts non-strategic exporters as described above earns large 
abnormal returns.  The value-weight excess returns on this long-short portfolio 
equals 50 basis points per month (t=2.15); the corresponding value-weight four-
factor alpha is 57 basis points per month (t=2.78).  The long-short DGTW-
adjusted returns are 39 basis points per month (t=2.23).
8   These estimates 
translate to annual abnormal returns of roughly 5-7% per year.  Most of the 
return spread comes from the long side of the portfolio; for example, the long 
portfolio return earns a 4-factor alpha of 53 basis points (t=2.82), while the short 
portfolio alpha is small and insignificant.
9    Panel B reveals similar, but 
																																																								
8 As we weaken the strength of the ethnic connection, for example by using a Top 5/Top5 cutoff 
or a Top 10/Top 10 cutoff (rather than a Top 3/Top 3 cutoff as described in Section IV.A) in 
order to define our strategic importers, the results are weaker, as we would expect.  For example, 
the DGTW-adjusted returns on the long-short portfolio are 37 basis points per month (t=1.88) 
using a Top 5/Top 5 cutoff, and 29 basis points per month (t=1.64) using a Top 10/Top 10 
cutoff.    
9 As described in Section IV.A, the short portfolio here includes the set of non-strategic exporters, 
i.e., firms that are located in regions without a strong ethnic link to a particular country, and yet 
choose to export to that country anyway.  We have also run tests where the short portfolio 
includes the subset of non-strategic exporters who have a strong ethnic tie to at least one 
particular country, and yet choose to export to a different country.  These long-short portfolio 
returns are even larger in magnitude, and the short portfolio returns are more negative, but the  
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statistically weaker, results for importers.  For example, the value-weight excess 
returns on the imports long-short portfolio equals 45 basis points per month 
(t=1.75); the corresponding value-weight four-factor alpha is 38 basis points per 
month (t=1.45), and the long-short DGTW-adjusted returns are 45 basis points 
per month (t=1.92).   
Collectively, the calendar-time portfolio results in Table VII indicate that 
strategic traders (particularly strategic exporters) earn substantial abnormal 
returns relative to their non-strategic counterparts.  This result suggests that 
these firms are not overweighting certain countries in their import and export 
decisions due to a form of familiarity bias, but rather as a result of superior 
private information about certain countries.  Further, the market does not seem 
to recognize the advantage of these types of strategic export/import decisions by 
firms, as the mimicking portfolios in Table VII produce economically meaningful 
abnormal returns.     
 
C. Connected Board Members and Future Returns 
From Table III, connected board members had a large and significant 
relationship with trade decisions by firms.  In this section, similar to Section B, 
we test whether the market realizes the potentially positive impact to firm value 
of import and export decisions made by firms who have the strategic link to their 
trading partners of a connected board member.  The measure we use for this is 
Pct of Board Strategically Connected, which is simply the percentage of the 
board that is from countries to which the firm is actively engaged in importing or 
exporting.  In Table VIII, we run Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional predictive 
regressions of future returns with this variable, controlling for other known return 
																																																																																																																																																																					
long-short portfolios contain fewer stocks, and hence these returns are noisier and statistically 
insignificant.  For example, the long-short CAPM, 3-factor and 4-factor alphas from Panel A are 
78 basis points (t-1.08), 96 basis points (t=1.39) and 58 basis points (t=0.86) for this finer 
specification.  
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determinants.
10    If these connected board members are helpful in making 
strategically valuable decisions, and the market does not fully understand this 
(much like the strategic trading in Section B more generally), then we expect a 
positive coefficient on Pct of Board Strategically Connected.  This is precisely 
what we see in all four columns of Table VIII.  Examining both the full sample of 
firms, and solely the subsample of firms that have at least 1 connected board 
member (to test whether the percentage of board members, and not simply the 
existence of any connected board member relative to zero), we see a large and 
significant coefficient on Pct of Board Strategically Connected.  To give an idea 
of magnitude, the coefficient in Column 4 of 0.077 (t=2.13), implies that a firm 
with a strategically connected board member to the country it is trading with has 
future returns of 60 basis points per month higher than a firm trading with same 
country but no connected board member. 
 
D. Analyst Attention to Information in Imports and Exports 
In Sections A-C above we showed that strategic importing and exporting 
had an impact on real firm outcomes, but that this impact was not fully 
understood by investors in setting market price.  In this section we test whether 
other, potentially more sophisticated financial agents, namely sell-side securities 
analysts, are better able to assess the large value of this strategic information link 
advantage.  A large part of an analyst’s job is to research, produce, and disclose 
reports forecasting aspects of companies’ future prospects, and to translate their 
forecasts into earnings forecasts.  Thus, we test whether analysts understand the 
value-enhancing nature of these strategic importing and exporting decisions by 
analyzing analysts’ ability to correctly impound this information into their 
earnings forecasts of firms who exploit these strategic networks versus firms that 
do not.   
																																																								
10 Given the smaller number of firms that have board members from foreign countries in general, 
the portfolio approach of Table VII yielded too thin of portfolios, and so we utilize the Fama-
MacBeth regression framework to test the thesis in Table VIII.  
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We report two sets of tests of this idea in Table IX.  The first test simply 
examines whether analysts are more inaccurate in their forecasts of strategic 
trading firms versus non-strategic trading firms.  We do this using the variable 
Earnings Forecast Error, which is defined as is the absolute value of the actual 
reported earnings (EPS) value minus the consensus mean of the most recent 
analyst forecasts (in the month leading up to the announcement), scaled by the 
absolute value of actual EPS reported (winsorized at the 0.01 level).  We regress 
Earnings Forecast Error for each firm on whether or not the firm is a strategic 
importer (exporter), along with a number of other controls (from Table VIII), 
and fixed effects for month and industry.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
monthly level.  Columns 3 and 4 (and 7 and 8) tell a consistent story: analysts do 
not seem to be correctly taking into account the information in strategic 
importing or exporting, and so are significantly more inaccurate on these firms.  
To give an idea of the magnitude, the coefficient in Column 4 of 2.874 (t=2.53) 
suggests that analysts are 15% less accurate on strategic exporting firms than on 
other firms.  In contrast, we see no such inaccuracy on non-strategic importers or 
exporters, as analysts appear to be able to roughly correctly forecast their 
earnings, on average.  
Given that firms’ strategic trading yields real value in terms of future sales 
growth and profitability, and that both price setters and analysts seem to not 
fully understand or impound this information into prices, earnings 
announcements might be the exact times that the information embedded in these 
real quantities is impounded into prices (as it is revealed to the markets in these 
quarterly statements).  We test this directly by examining whether the earnings 
surprise cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of strategic traders are different 
than those of non-strategic traders.  Earnings Surprise CAR is defined as the 
cumulative abnormal return (t-1,t+1) around the earnings date (t).  The main 
independent variable of interest (strategic importer (exporter)) remains the same, 
as do all controls and specifications, with the addition of one new control 
variable, (Act EPS — Est), controlling for the magnitude and direction of the 
actual earnings surprise itself.  These regressions are in Columns 1 and 2 (and 5  
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and 6) of Table IX.  All four columns show that strategic importers (exporters) 
have significantly larger Earnings Surprise CARs, consistent with these being 
times that the advantages of strategic trading are revealed to the market and 
impounded into prices.  Again, we see no such increased Earnings Surprise CARs 
for the non-strategic firms. 
Taken together, the evidence in Section IV indicates that it is precisely the 
firms that exploit their ethnic information links that achieve higher sales growth 
and profitability.  Firms that exhibit the exact same behavior as these firms, but 
that do not have these ethnic links (i.e., non-strategic importers and exporters), 
experience neither of these favorable outcomes.  Further, the market does not 
fully understand or incorporate this advantage into strategic firms’ prices, 
generating predictably large, future abnormal returns (which also exist for firms 
exploiting connected boards).  Lastly, analysts also do not appear to take into 
account the advantages of strategic importing and exporting, and so are 
significantly less accurate in their earnings forecasts on these strategic trading 
firms.    
 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we exploit variation in ethnic population breakdowns across 
the U.S. to examine how local residents’ ties to their home-countries can 
influence firms’ international trade decisions.  We exploit novel customs and port 
authority data detailing the international shipments of all U.S. publicly-traded 
firms, and show that firms import and export significantly more with countries 
that have a strong resident population near their firm headquarters location.  We 
use the formation of World War II Japanese Internment Camps to isolate 
exogenous shocks to local ethnic populations, and identify a causal link between 
local networks and firm trade.   
We find that firms that exploit these local networks in their international 
trade decisions (strategic traders) experience significant increases in future sales 
growth and profitability.  We show that although we can predict which trade  
25 
	
links, on average, are valuable for firms using simple measures of connected 
population that are publicly available, the market seems to ignore this 
information.  In particular, strategic importers and exporters outperform other 
importers and exporters by 5%-7% per year in risk-adjusted returns.  The 
increased value of strategic traders is also missed by analysts, who are 
significantly less accurate in their earnings forecasts on these firms, with these 
firms having significantly more positive earnings surprises. 
We then provide additional evidence on the mechanism by showing that at 
times when the information network represents a more valuable link, specifically 
at times of tariff cuts to the connected country, our effects are even larger.  We 
show that one particular channel of the information network is through board 
members: a connected local population predicts more board members from that 
same country, and a significantly higher value for those firms that exploit 
connected board members in their trade decisions.   
While we focus on immigration and how demographic factors affect the 
import and export behavior of firms, we believe that our approach can be readily 
adapted to study other local advantage factors.  Our research also provides new 
evidence on the economic impact of immigration and ethnic diversity in the 
United States.  Immigrants’ conduit roles in economic transactions almost surely 
stretch far beyond those we document in this paper.  
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Figure 1: Japanese Internment Camps of World War II 
 
This figure presents summary statistics on aspects related to the Japanese Internment Camps of World War 
II. Panel A shows a map of the US, indication where the ten internment camps eere located, delineating 
them with a old text with a dot (Daniel (1993)).  Panel B is a table giving the location of the 10 internment 
camps, along with peak populations in each camp (CLPEF (1998)).  Panel C shows the Japanese population 
in 1940 in each of the seven states that would later house internment camps, from the United States Census 
of 1940. 
 
Panel A: Map of 10 Internment Camps 
 
 
 
Panel B: Populations of 10 Internment Camps 
 
Panel C: Pre-Internment Camps Population (from 1940 census) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center   State 
Date of first 
arrival 
Peak 
Population  Date of peak  Date of last 
Gila River  AZ  7/20/42 13,348 12/30/42 11/10/45 
Granada CO  8/27/42 7,318 2/1/43 10/15/45 
Heart Mountain  WY  8/12/42 10,767 1/1/43 11/10/45 
Jerome AR  10/6/42 8,497 2/11/43 6/30/44 
Manzanar CA  3/21/42 10,046 9/22/42 11/21/45 
Minidoka ID  8/10/42 9,397 3/1/43 10/28/45 
Poston AZ  5/8/42 17,814 9/2/42 11/28/45 
Rohwer AR  9/18/42 8,475 3/11/43 11/30/45 
Topaz UT  9/11/42 8,130 3/17/43 10/31/45 
Tule Lake  CA  5/27/42 18,789 12/25/44 3/20/46 
State  ST  Total Population  Japanese Population 
Arizona AZ  499,261  632 
Arkansas AR  1,949,387  3 
California CA 6,907,367  93,717 
Colorado CO  123,296  2,734 
Idaho ID  524,873  1,191 
Utah UT  550,310  2,210 
Wyoming WY  250,742  643  
 
	
Table I: Summary Statistics for Importers and Exporters 
 
This table presents summary statistics on the firms included in the tests. MVE is the market 
value of equity calculated as the price end of calendar year prior to fiscal year end multiplied by 
number of shares outstanding. B/M is the book to market ratio where the book value of equity is 
calculated as sum of stock holders equity (SEQ), Deferred Tax (TXDB), Investment Tax Credit 
(ITCB) minus Preferred Stock (PREF). Leverage is long-term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current 
liabilities (DLC), divided by the numerator plus market equity. Momentum is the twelve month 
return prior to fiscal year end. ROA (return on asset) earnings before tax and depreciation 
(EBITDA) scaled by total assets (TA). PPE/TA is the ratio of plant, property, and equity 
(PPENT) scaled by total assets. Unit of observation is firm-year. Panel A (B) reports the 
summary statistics for public firms, which exported (imported) at least once in a given year. The 
sample period covers 1994 to 2010. Panel C reports the industry breakdown of importers and 
exporters by 2-digit NAICS code.  
Panel A:  Firm level data for exporters 
MVE B/M  Leverage Momentum ROA PPE/TA 
mean   4,929   0.723  0.223  0.175  0.119  0.284 
sd   20,899    1.591  0.174  0.714  0.146  0.201 
p5   9    0.125  0.000  -0.558  -0.066  0.029 
p10   19    0.185 0.000  -0.419  0.015 0.059 
p25   74    0.314 0.071  -0.177  0.078 0.132 
p50   404   0.527 0.209  0.081  0.129 0.241 
p75   2,044    0.858 0.339  0.365  0.182 0.392 
p90   8,598    1.345 0.455  0.754  0.239 0.579 
p95   20,142    1.822 0.534  1.158  0.279 0.692 
N   20,073    20,073   20,122    19,713    20,021   20,046  
 
Panel B:  Firm level data for Importers 
 MVE  B/M  Leverage Momentum ROA  PPE/TA 
mean   4,889   0.711  0.211  0.182  0.107  0.265 
sd   20,595    0.934  0.175  0.783  0.160  0.201 
p5   11   0.127  0.000  -0.583  -0.104  0.020 
p10   23    0.185 0.000  -0.434  -0.003  0.043 
p25   87    0.313 0.051  -0.187  0.068 0.109 
p50   455   0.523 0.195  0.078  0.122 0.220 
p75   2,110    0.847 0.328  0.371  0.175 0.372 
p90   8,626    1.320 0.448  0.789  0.232 0.564 
p95   19,450    1.800 0.528  1.208  0.273 0.676 
N   23,743    23,743   23,787    23,298    23,687   23,722  
 
  
 
	
Table I: Summary Statistics (continued) 
 
 
Panel C:  Industry Breakdown of Exporters and Importers 
 
NAICS 2 Importers Exporters  Definition 
11 17  16  Agriculture,  Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 
21  114  112  Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 
22 78  52  Utilities 
23 43  39  Construction 
31-33 2,358  1,994  Manufacturing 
42 194 184 Wholesale  Trade 
44-45 340  274  Retail  Trade 
48-49  93  80  Transportation and Warehousing 
51 290 163 Information 
52 245 169 Finance  and  Insurance 
53-54  221  159  Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
56 77  58  Admin/Support/Waste Management and Remediation Services 
61 8  4  Educational  Services 
62  36  32  Health Care and Social Assistance 
71  19  13  Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 
72  59  43  Accommodation and Food Services 
81  49  39  Other Services (except Public Administration) 
Total 4,241  3,431 
 
  
 
	
Table II: Major U.S. and Foreign Ports 
 
This table reports the top 5 ports used by the sample firms for imports and exports in U.S. and 
foreign countries. The figures reported are annual dollar value of imports and exports (in billions) 
throughout the sample period (1994-2010).  
 
Panel A: Top 5 Importing U.S. Ports 
LOS ANGELES   185  
LONG BEACH   159  
NEW YORK   95  
SEATTLE   62   
NORFOLK   61   
 
 
Panel B: Top 5 Exporting U.S. Ports 
HOUSTON 110 
LOS ANGELES  85 
NEW YORK  75 
NORFOLK 66 
CHARLESTON 61 
 
 
Panel C: Top 5 Origination Ports for U.S. Imports 
HONG KONG  125 
RICHARDS BAY  105 
YANTIAN 76 
KAOHSIUNG 63 
SHANGHAI 61 
 
 
Panel D: Top 5 Destination Ports for U.S. Exports 
ANTWERP 66 
ROTTERDAM 57 
VANCOUVER 50 
HONG KONG  43 
SINGAPORE 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
	
Table III: The Impact of Ethnic Connections on Firm-Level Trade 
 
Panel A of this table presents coefficient estimates of OLS (first column) and fixed effects 
regressions (second and third column) of export ratio (ER) on Connected Population (CP) and 
control variables: ERict = b1+ b2* CPct + b3* Connected Board Member + fixed effects. Export 
Ratio (ER) is total amount a given firm exports to a destination country in a given year scaled 
by total amount of exports of the same firm in the same year (Eict /Sum(Eit) ). Connected 
population is the number of residents in a firm’s headquarter MSA connected to the export 
country scaled by total population in that state (CPct). Connected Board Member is a binary 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has a board member with an ethnic background the 
same as the export destination. Panel B of this table presents coefficient estimates of the 
following specification: IRict = b1+ b2* CPct + b3* Connected Board Member + fixed effects, 
where import ratio (IR) is total amount a given firm imports from a country in a given year 
scaled by total amount of imports of the same firm in the same year (Iict /Sum(Iit)). T-stats, 
clustered by year, are reported below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Exports 
 
   Export 
Ratio 
Export 
Ratio 
Export 
Ratio 
Export 
Ratio 
Connected Population  0.039***'  0.039*** 0.122*** 0.043*** 
(5.14)   (4.71)  (4.35)   (5.42) 
Connected Board Member  0.014*** 
(3.42)  
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  No  No  No 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes  No No No 
Firm x Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
State x Partner Country Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  No 
Adj.  R2  0.46  0.59 0.10 0.59 
Number of Observations  80,529  80,529  80,529  80,529 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
	
Table III: The Impact of Ethnic Connections on Firm-Level Trade (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Imports 
 
   Import 
Ratio 
Import 
Ratio 
Import 
Ratio 
Import 
Ratio 
Connected Population  0.022**  0.032*** 0.154*** 0.035*** 
(2.00)  (2.70)  (5.97)   (3.04)  
Connected Board Member  0.015*** 
(4.94)  
  
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  No  No  No 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes  No No No 
Firm x Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
State x Partner Country Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  No 
Adj.  R2  0.39  0.49 0.10 0.49 
Number  of  Observations  84,296  84,296 84,296 84,296 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
	
Table IV: Tariff Analysis 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates of fixed effects regressions of product import ratio (PIR) 
on Connected Population (CP) and control variables: PIRicpt = b1+ b2 * CPct + b3 * Tariff + b4 
* CPct x Tariff + Fixed Effects. Product Import Ratio (PIR) is total amount a given firm imports 
from a foreign country in a given year scaled by total amount of imports of the same firm in the 
same year (Iicpt /Sum(Iit)). Connected population is the number of residents in a firm’s 
headquarter MSA connected to the import country scaled by total population in that state 
(CPct). Tariff is the value of the US tariff on the given product to the given country, taken from 
the TRAINS dataset maintained by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).  Fixed effects for firm, year, and product are included where indicated.  T-stats, 
clustered by year, are reported below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
   Product 
Import Ratio 
Product 
Import Ratio 
Product 
Import Ratio 
Product 
Import Ratio 
Connected  Population  0.0046** 0.0046** 0.0074***  0.0020 
(2.43)  (2.46) (3.93) (1.06) 
Tariff -0.00003  0.0001  0.0004 
(0.18) (0.73) (1.61) 
Connected Population x Tariff    -0.0022***  -0.0014*** 
 (4.49)  (3.48) 
Firm  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product  Fixed  Effects  No No No Yes 
              
Adj.  R2  0.40 0.40 0.40 0.48 
Number  of  Observations  34,062 34,062 34,062 34,062 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
	
Table V: Japanese Internment Analysis 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates of instrumental variable estimation for exports (imports) 
in the first (last) two columns. The sample includes only the exports to (or imports from) Japan. 
In the first two columns, the dependent variable in the second stage is the export ratio (ER). 
Export Ratio (ER) is total amount a given firm exports to a destination country in a given year 
scaled by total amount of exports of the same firm in the same year (Eict /Sum(Eit)). In the last 
two columns, the dependent variable in the second stage is the import ratio (IR). Import ratio 
(IR) is total amount a given firm imports from a country in a given year scaled by total amount 
of imports of the same firm in the same year (Iict /Sum(Iit)). Connected population is the number 
of residents in a firm’s headquarter MSA connected to the export (import) country scaled by total 
population in that state (CPct). The instrument, Japanese Internment is a binary variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the headquarter of the firm is located in a state that housed one of the 
internment camps.  T-stats, clustered by year, are reported below coefficient estimates. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
First Stage        
   Connected 
Population 
Connected 
Population 
Connected 
Population 
Connected 
Population 
Japanese Internment    0.0080***    0.0017***    0.010***    0.0019***  
 (35.29)    (22.53)    (31.07)   (27.01) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
CA, OR, WA, HI Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Second Stage       
  Export Ratio  Export Ratio  Import Ratio  Import Ratio 
Instrumented Connected Population  11.865***   60.612***   8.668***   45.099**  
(4.04) (4.89)  (5.02) (2.28) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
CA, OR, WA, HI Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  548.74  129.75  3407.60  203.70 
Number of Observations  3,167  3,167  4,805  4,805 
 
 
 
 
  
 
	
Table VI: Real Effects of Strategic Trading Activity 
 
This table reports panel regressions of different measures of future firm-level real outcomes on lagged 
strategic trading activity.  For exports, we first create buy/sell signals based on a firm’s export amount in a 
given month, its destination country, and the match between the destination country’s ethnicity and the 
firm’s headquarter MSA’s (metropolitan statistical area) ethnic composition. We classify the American 
Communities Project (ACP) ethnicity classifications, and match these to destination countries as shown in 
Appendix Table A2. In every year for each MSA, we compute the share of each ethnicity that resides in 
each MSA.  We then rank the share of each ethnicity across all MSAs in the US.  The buy signal equals one 
if (i) a firm’s share of total industry exports to a given country in a given month is ranked in the top 3, and 
(ii) the firm is located in an MSA where the MSA’s ethnicity share across all MSAs in the US is ranked in 
the top 3.  The sell signal equals one if (i) a firm’s share of total industry exports to a given country is 
ranked in the top 3, but (ii) the firm is *not* located in an MSA where the MSA’s ethnicity share across all 
MSAs in the US is ranked in the top 3.  We define a firm as strategic exporter if the firm has at least one 
buy signal for any of its exports in a given year.  A firm is defined as a non-strategic exporter if it has zero 
buy signals in a given year, and has at least one sell signal.  The dependent variables are: 1) future sales (in 
year t+1) divided by lagged assets (in year t); and 2) ROA (defined as future EBITDA in year t+1 divided 
by lagged assets in year t). Control variables include Size (log of market capitalization), B/M (log of the 
book-to-market ratio), Leverage (long-term debt in year t divided by lagged assets in year t), and Cash 
(future Cash in year t+1 divided by lagged assets in year t).  Fixed effects for time (year) and firm are 
included in all regressions. t-stats, clustered by year, are reported below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Salest+1/Assetst  EBITDAt+1/Assetst  Salest+1/Assetst EBITDAt+1/Assetst
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)
      
Strategic Exporter  0.026***  0.021** 0.009* 0.010**  
 (2.89)  (2.16)  (2.05) (2.47)  
Non-Strategic Exporter  -0.000  0.001  -0.006*** -0.006***  
 (0.01)  (0.15)  (2.95) (3.14)  
Strategic Importer      0.019*** 0.021***  0.005 0.001
     (3.24) (3.86)  (0.64) (0.015)
Non-Strategic Importer      0.002 0.004  0.001 0.001
     (0.72) (1.14)  (0.36) (0.24)
Size   -0.048***    0.011**   -0.054***    0.011** 
   (13.47) (2.32) (14.48)    (3.13)
B/M   -0.122*** -0.063*** -0.134***    -0.070***
   (7.99)  (4.82) (8.53)    (6.03)
Leverage   -0.478  -0.014 -0.003    -0.419
   (1.72)  (0.05) (0.01)    (1.02)
Casht+1/At   -1.448** -0.270 -1.686***    -1.508
   (2.52)  (0.40) (3.33)    (1.43)
      
Time  Fixed  Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Firm  Fixed  Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Adjusted R
2  0.88  0.89 0.68 0.69 0.89 0.90 0.66 0.68
No. of Obs.  14,260  14,203  14,205 14,152 17,412 17,345  17,343 17,279
       
 
	
Table VII: Portfolio Returns to Strategic Trading Activity 
 
This table presents value-weight returns to calendar-time portfolios that buys stocks of strategic 
exporters and sell stocks of non-strategic exporters. In Panel A, we first create buy/sell signals 
based on a firm’s export amount in a given month, its destination country, and the match 
between the destination country’s ethnicity and the firm’s headquarter MSA’s (metropolitan 
statistical area) ethnic composition. We use the American Communities Project (ACP) ethnicity 
classifications, and match these to destination countries as shown in Appendix Table A2. In every 
year for each MSA, we compute the share of each ethnicity that resides in each MSA.  In every 
year for each MSA, we compute the share of each ethnicity that resides in each MSA.  We then 
rank the share of each ethnicity across all MSAs in the US.  The buy signal equals one if (i) a 
firm’s share of total industry exports to a given country in a given month is ranked in the top 3, 
and (ii) the firm is located in an MSA where the MSA’s ethnicity share across all MSAs in the US 
is ranked in the top 3.  The sell signal equals one if (i) a firm’s share of total industry exports to 
a given country is ranked in the top 3, but (ii) the firm is *not* located in an MSA where the 
MSA’s ethnicity share across all MSAs in the US is ranked in the top 3.  We define a firm as 
strategic exporter if the firm has at least one buy signal for any of its exports in a given month.  
A firm is defined as a non-strategic exporter if it has zero buy signals in a given month, and has 
at least one sell signal. Each month we construct calendar-time portfolios that buy stocks of 
strategic exporters and sell non-strategic exporters. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly, and stocks 
are held for one month.  The first row of each panel presents excess returns (raw returns minus 
the risk-free rate), the second row shows DGTW-adjusted returns, the third row shows CAPM 
alphas, the fourth row shows Fama-French 3-factor alphas, and the fifth row shows Carhart 4-
factor alphas.  In Panel B, we replicate the calendar time portfolio approach from Panel A for our 
imports sample.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Export Value-Weight Portfolio Returns
  Long Return  Short Return  (L-S) Return 
Excess returns  0.92*** 0.42  0.50** 
  (3.07) (1.38) (2.15) 
      
DGTW-adjusted returns  0.28  -0.11  0.39** 
  (1.52) (1.16) (2.23) 
      
CAPM alpha  0.62***  -0.02  0.64*** 
  (2.72) (0.19) (2.93) 
      
Fama-French 3-factor alpha  0.64***  -0.02  0.66*** 
  (3.30) (0.24) (3.18) 
      
Carhart 4-factor alpha  0.53***  -0.04  0.57*** 
  (2.82) (0.41) (2.78)  
 
	
Table VII: Portfolio Returns to Strategic Trading Activity (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Import Value-Weight Portfolio Returns
  Long Return  Short Return  (L-S) Return 
Excess returns  0.87** 0.42  0.45* 
  (2.31) (1.38) (1.75) 
      
DGTW-adjusted returns  0.34  -0.11  0.45* 
  (1.52) (1.36) (1.92) 
      
CAPM alpha  0.43*  -0.02  0.44* 
  (1.75) (0.15) (1.71) 
      
Fama-French 3-factor alpha  0.43*  -0.01  0.44* 
  (1.74) (0.06) (1.68) 
      
Carhart 4-factor alpha  0.37  -0.01  0.38 
  (1.48) (0.11) (1.45)  
 
	
Table VIII: Connected Board Members and Returns 
 
This table reports predictive regressions of future month returns on connectedness of a firm’s 
board from 1999-2010.  The independent variable of interest is Pct of Board Strategically 
Connected, which is equal to the percentage of the board of directors that are from a foreign 
country to which the firm is either importing from, or exporting to, in the month prior.  Other 
control variables include Size, the natural logarithm of market capitalization, B/M, the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of book value to market value, Past Month Returns, returns in the month 
prior to the earnings announcement, and Past Returns (t-2,t-12), return from month t-2 to t-12.  
In Columns 1 and 2, the full sample of firms are included, while Columns 3 and 4 are run on only 
the sample of firms that have at least one strategically connected board member.  Month fixed 
effects and Industry-Month fixed effects are included where indicated.  Standard errors, adjusting 
for clustering at the month level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Future-month returns
Sample:  Full Sample  Only if have at least one
connected board member 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   
Pct of Board Strategically   0.082** 0.091*** 0.075** 0.077** 
Connected (2.41) (2.80) (2.10) (2.13) 
        
Board Size  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.66) (1.08) (0.57) (0.37) 
Size  -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.003***  -0.002*** 
 (2.81) (2.67) (2.96) (2.68) 
B/M 0.011* 0.011* 0.012 0.011 
 (1.87) (1.80) (1.58) (1.36) 
Past Ret(t-2,t-12)  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.59) (0.54) (0.18) (0.18) 
Past Month Returns  -0.034** -0.032** -0.026 -0.027 
 (2.33) (2.27) (1.33) (1.48) 
   
Time Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  
Industry x Time Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.23 0.28 0.26 0.36 
No. of Obs.  38,040 38,040 11,039 11,039  
 
	
Table IX: Errors in Analyst Forecasts and Earnings Surprises 
 
This table reports regressions of earnings forecast error and earnings surprise cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) on strategic trading of firms. In the first two columns, the dependent variable is Earnings CAR.  
This is defined as the cumulative abnormal return (t-1,t+1) around the earnings date.  The dependent 
variable in Column 3 and Column 4 is earnings Forecast Error.  This is the absolute value of the actual 
reported earnings (EPS) value minus the consensus mean of the most recent analyst forecasts (in the month 
leading up to the announcement), scaled by the absolute value of actual EPS reported.  This is then 
winsorized at the 0.01 level.  The main variables of interest, Strategic Exporter/Importer, are defined in 
Table VI.  Other control variables include Size, the natural logarithm of market capitalization, B/M, the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of book value to market value, Past Month Returns, returns in the month 
prior to the earnings announcement, Past Returns (t-2,t-12), return from month t-2 to t-12, and (Actual 
EPS-Estimate), which is the magnitude of the earnings surprise in the earnings announcement.  Month and 
industry fixed effects are included where indicated.  Standard errors, adjusting for clustering at the month 
level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
  Earnings CAR  Forecast Error Earnings CAR Forecast Error
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)
      
Strategic Exporter  0.487*  0.577** 2.861** 2.874**  
 (1.90)  (2.24)  (2.48) (2.53)  
Non-Strategic Exporter  0.046  0.063  0.414 0.233  
 (0.36)  (0.50)  (0.78) (0.43)  
Strategic Importer      0.634** 0.665***  3.880***  3.886***
     (2.58) (2.66)  (2.66)  (2.64)
Non-Strategic Importer      -0.046 -0.03 -1.034*  -1.357**
     (0.41) (0.27)  (1.86)  (2.42)
Past Month Returns 
-0.93  -0.914 -3.544  -3.841  -1.114 -1.131 -2.138  -2.036 
 (1.15)  (1.13)  (0.91) (0.99) (1.40) (1.41) (0.65)  (0.62)
Size 
-0.083** -0.072*  -3.693*** -3.678*** -0.099** -0.090** -3.935*** -3.981*** 
  (2.04) (1.77) (18.10) (17.92) (2.50) (2.25) (23.12) (23.17)
B/M  -0.072 -0.053 6.378*** 6.327*** -0.137 -0.136 6.569***  6.464***
  (0.60) (0.44) (14.41) (14.19) (1.31) (1.30) (15.21) (14.78)
Past Ret(t-2,t-12)  0.007  -0.007  -4.465*** -4.538*** -0.138 -0.14 -4.519*** -4.639***
 (0.04)  (0.05)  (3.78) (3.78) (0.77) (0.79) (5.39)  (5.46)
(Act EPS — Est)  3.594***  3.585*** 4.189*** 4.19***   
 (12.40)  (12.43) (17.01) (16.97)   
      
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Industry Fixed Effects    Yes  Yes Yes   Yes
Adjusted R
2  0.08 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.11  0.11
No. of Obs.  15,951  15,951 15,951 15,951 20,383 20,383  20,384  20,384
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Table A1: Summary Statistics on Firms that Do Not Import/Export 
 
MVE is the market value of equity calculated as the price end of calendar year prior to fiscal year 
end multiplied by number of shares outstanding. B/M is the book to market ratio where the book 
value of equity is calculated as sum of stockholders equity (SEQ), Deferred Tax (TXDB), 
Investment Tax Credit (ITCB) minus Preferred Stock (PREF). Leverage is long-term debt 
(DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities (DLC), divided by the numerator plus market equity. 
Momentum is the twelve month return prior to fiscal year end. ROA (return on asset) earnings 
before tax and depreciation (EBITDA) scaled by total assets (TA). PPE/TA is the ratio of plant, 
property, and equity (PPENT) scaled by total assets. Unit of observation is firm-year. Panel A 
(B) reports the summary statistics for public firms, which exported (imported) at least once in a 
given year. The sample period covers 1994 to 2010. Panel C reports volume imports and exports 
in top 20 ports of United States.  
Panel A:  Firm level data for Non-Exporters 
MVE B/M  Leverage Momentum ROA  PPE/TA 
mean  1,896 16.515 0.216  0.172  -0.011  0.271 
sd  11,222 1,721.287 0.215  1.084  1.646 0.277 
p5   3   0.063  0.000  -0.694  -0.536  0.003 
p10   7   0.132  0.000  -0.547  -0.255  0.010 
p25   24   0.301  0.018  -0.265  -0.005  0.039 
p50   108   0.579  0.163  0.039  0.071  0.161 
p75   555   0.974  0.352  0.363  0.141  0.448 
p90   2,569   1.605  0.527  0.844  0.213  0.741 
p95   6,854   2.339  0.639  1.364  0.270  0.840 
N   144,330   144,330  167,639  106,365  161,877 163,223 
 
Panel B:  Firm level data for Non-Importers 
 MVE  B/M  Leverage Momentum ROA  PPE/TA 
mean  1,824 16.929 0.218  0.170  -0.012  0.273 
sd  10,942 1,743.596 0.216  1.084  1.665 0.278 
p5   3   0.061  0.000  -0.694  -0.541  0.002 
p10   6   0.130  0.000  -0.547  -0.259  0.010 
p25   23   0.301  0.019  -0.265  -0.006  0.039 
p50   102   0.581  0.165  0.038  0.071  0.164 
p75   521   0.980  0.354  0.361  0.141  0.454 
p90   2,418   1.617  0.530  0.838  0.214  0.745 
p95   6,523   2.353  0.641  1.357  0.271  0.843 
N   140,660   140,660  163,974  102,780  158,211 159,547 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
	
Table A2: Country-MSA Population Mapping 
	
	
Country Name 
Population in 
US Country  Name 
Population in 
US 
1 Argentina  Argentinian  36 Japan  Japanese 
2 Australia  White  37 Korea,  Rep.  Korean 
3 Austria  White  38 Latvia  White 
4 Barbados  Mexican  39 Lithuania  White 
5 Belgium  White  40 Malaysia  Filipino 
6 Belize  Mexican  41 Malta  White 
7 Brazil  Mexican  42 Mexico  Mexican 
8 Bulgaria  White  43 Netherlands  White 
9 Cambodia  Filipino  44 New  Zealand  White 
10 Canada  White  45 Nicaragua  Nicaraguan 
11 Chile  Chilean  46 Norway  White 
12 China  Chinese  47 Panama  Panamanian 
13 Colombia  Colombian  48 Paraguay  Paraguayan 
14  Costa Rica  Costa Rican  49 Peru  Peruvian 
15 Cuba  Cuban  50 Philippines  Filipino 
16 Czechoslovakia  White  51 Poland  White 
17 Denmark  White  52 Portugal  White 
18  Dominican Rep.  Dominican  53 Puerto Rico  Puerto Rican 
19 Ecuador  Ecuadorian  54 Romania  White 
20 El  Salvador  Salvadorian  55 Russia  White 
21 Finland  White  56 Singapore  Chinese 
22 France  White  57 Spain  Mexican 
23 Germany  White  58 Sweden  White 
24 Greece  White  59 Switzerland  White 
25 Guatemala  Guatemalan  60 Taiwan,  China  Chinese 
26 Haiti  Mexican  61 Thailand  Filipinos 
27 Honduras  Honduran  62 Turkey  White 
28 Hong  Kong  Chinese  63 Ukraine  White 
29 Hungary  White  64 United  Kingdom  White 
30 Iceland  White  65 Uruguay  Uruguayan 
31 India  Indian  66 Venezuela  Venezuelan 
32 Indonesia  Filipino  67 Vietnam  Vietnamese 
33 Ireland  White  68 Yugoslavia(FR)    White 
34 Israel  White  69 South  Africa  White 
35 Italy  White 
	
 
 
 
 
  
 
	
Table A3: Country-Census Ethnicity Mapping 
 
Country Name  Ethnicity  Country Name  Ethnicity 
1 Argentina  HISPANIC  36 Japan  JAPANESE 
2 Australia  WHITE  37 Korea,  Rep.  KOREAN 
3 Austria  WHITE  38 Latvia  WHITE 
4 Barbados  HISPANIC  39 Lithuania  WHITE 
5 Belgium  WHITE  40 Malaysia  FILIPINO 
6 Belize  HISPANIC  41 Malta  WHITE 
7 Brazil  HISPANIC  42 Mexico  HISPANIC 
8 Bulgaria  WHITE  43 Netherlands  WHITE 
9 Cambodia  FILIPINO  44 New  Zealand  WHITE 
10 Canada  WHITE  45  Nicaragua  HISPANIC 
11 Chile  HISPANIC  46  Norway  WHITE 
12 China  CHINESE  47  Panama  HISPANIC 
13 Colombia  HISPANIC  48  Paraguay  HISPANIC 
14 Costa  Rica  HISPANIC  49  Peru  HISPANIC 
15 Cuba  HISPANIC  50  Philippines  FILIPINO 
16 Czechoslovakia  WHITE  51  Poland  WHITE 
17 Denmark  WHITE  52  Portugal  WHITE 
18 Dominican  Rep.  HISPANIC  53 Puerto  Rico  HISPANIC 
19 Ecuador  HISPANIC  54  Romania  WHITE 
20 El  Salvador  HISPANIC  55  Russia  WHITE 
21 Finland  WHITE  56  Singapore  CHINESE 
22 France  WHITE  57  Spain  HISPANIC 
23 Germany  WHITE  58  Sweden  WHITE 
24 Greece  WHITE  59  Switzerland  WHITE 
25 Guatemala  HISPANIC  60  Taiwan,  China  CHINESE 
26 Haiti  HISPANIC  61  Thailand  FILIPINO 
27 Honduras  HISPANIC  62  Turkey  WHITE 
28 Hong  Kong  CHINESE  63  Ukraine  WHITE 
29 Hungary  WHITE  64  United  Kingdom  WHITE 
30 Iceland  WHITE  65  Uruguay  HISPANIC 
31 India  INDIAN  66  Venezuela  HISPANIC 
32 Indonesia  FILIPINO  67 Vietnam  VIETNAMESE 
33 Ireland  WHITE  68  Yugoslavia(FR)    WHITE 
34 Israel  WHITE  69  South  Africa  WHITE 
35 Italy  WHITE 
 
  
 
	
Table A4: State-level Connected Population 
 
Panel A of this table presents coefficient estimates of OLS (first column) and fixed effects 
regressions (second and third column) of export ratio (ER) on Connected Population (CP) and 
control variables: ERict = b1+ b2* CPct + b3* Connected Board Member + Firm Fixed Effect + 
Year Fixed Effect+ Ethnicity Fixed Effect + FirmxYear Fixed Effect. Export Ratio (ER) is total 
amount a given firm exports to a destination country in a given year scaled by total amount of 
exports of the same firm in the same year (Eict /Sum(Eit) ). Connected population is the number 
of residents in firm’s headquarter state connected to export country scaled by total population in 
that state (CPct). Connected Board Member is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm 
has a board member with an ethnic background similar to export destination.  Panel B of this 
table presents coefficient estimates of the following specification: IRict = b1+ b2* CPct + Firm 
Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect+ Ethnicity Fixed Effect + FirmxYear Fixed Effect, where 
import ratio (IR) is total amount a given firm imports from a country in a given year scaled by 
total amount of imports of the same firm in the same year (Iict /Sum(Iit)). T-stats, clustered by 
year, are reported below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Exports 
 
   Export Ratio  Export Ratio  Export Ratio  Export Ratio 
Connected Population  0.027***'  0.025**  0.313***  0.027*** 
(2.70)   (2.50)   (5.13)   (2.94)  
Connected Board Member  0.012*** 
(3.31)  
Firm  Fixed  Effects  Yes  No No No 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  No  No  No 
FirmxYear  Fixed  Effects  No Yes  No Yes 
Ethnicity  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
StatexPartnerCountry  Fixed  Effects  No No Yes  No 
Adj.  R2  0.48 0.64 0.04 0.64 
Number  of  Observations  106,788 106,788 106,788 106,788 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
	
Table A4: State-Level Connected Population (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Imports 
 
   Import Ratio  Import Ratio Import  Ratio Import  Ratio 
Connected  Population  0.049*** 0.058*** 0.381*** 0.061*** 
(4.08)   (4.46)   (5.01)   (4.85)  
Connected Board Member  0.013*** 
(4.02)  
  
Firm  Fixed  Effects  Yes  No No No 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  No  No  No 
FirmxYear  Fixed  Effects  No Yes  No Yes 
Ethnicity  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
StatexPartnerCountry  Fixed  Effects  No No Yes  No 
Adj.  R2  0.39 0.57 0.06 0.57 
Number  of  Observations  103,829 103,829 103,829 103,829 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 